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Abstract
Abstract
We study how the phenomenon of contagion can take place in the network of the world’s
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stock exchanges due to the behavioral trait ”blindeness to small changes”. On large scale
individual, the delay in the collective response may significantly change the dynamics of
the overall system. We explicitely insert a term describing the behavioral phenomenon in a
system of equations that describe the build and release of stress across the worldwide stock
markets. In the mathematical formulation of the model, each stock exchange acts as an
integrate-and-fire oscillator. Calibration on market data validate the model. One advantage
of the integrate-and-fire dynamics is that it enables for a direct identification of cause and
effect of price movements, without the need for statistical tests such as for example Granger
causality tests often used in the identification of causes of contagion. Our methodology can
thereby identify the most relevant nodes with respect to onset of contagion in the network of
stock exchanges, as well as identify potential periods of high vulnerability of the network.
The model is characterized by a separation of time scales created by a slow build up of
stresses, for example due to (say monthly/yearly) macroeconomic factors, and then a fast
(say hourly/daily) release of stresses through ”price-quakes” of price movements across the
worlds network of stock exchanges.
Keywords Contagions, world’s stock exchange, blindness to small changes, integrate-and-
fire oscillators
1 1. Introduction
The financial market turmoil around the 2008 sub-prime crisis has been an awakening for aca-
demics and policy-makers to understand and capture the linkages and vulnerabilities of the
financial system. Much of such efforts have been focused around systemic risks and contagion
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phenomena. The issue of instability is however not new and has been put forward since the
great depression era of the 1930’s by e.g. Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1936). The subject itself
is nonetheless not without controversy since some argue that the use of the term contagion is
misplaced and financial markets rather show a high level of market co-movement at all times
and should rather be called market “interdependence” (Forbes and Rigobon 2002).
A large part of studies on contagion relates to correlation-based networks. For instance,
in Chiang et al. (2007), the contagion is detected from the statistical analysis of the corre-
lation among markets and with a behavioral perspective that consists in the interpretation of
the continued high correlation as herding. As mentioned in Aloui et al. (2011) studies of the
transmission of return and volatility shocks from one market to another as well as studies of
the cross-market correlations are essential in finance, because they have many implications for
portfolio allocation. Their paper used a multivariate copula approach to examine the extreme
co-movement across markets in order to study the harmful consequences of contagion effects
on portfolio selection.
In Bekaert et al. (2003), the contagion is defined as correlation between markets in excess
of what would be implied by the fundamentals. However, this definition makes the measure-
ment quite difficult because there is no common agreement on the definition of fundamentals,
although the model may explicitly consider macroeconomic variables (Syllignakis and Koure-
tas (2011)). In Caporale et al.(2005), Chiang et al. (2007), the contagion is detected through
co-movements of the correlation. Thus, the main issue is on modeling the correlations Celik
(2012), Dimitriou et al. (2013), Gjika and Horvath (2013), Mensi et al. (2013) or the coin-
tegration Hong et al. (2009). Such debates led to the discussion of the difference between
interdependence and contagion, Ahmad et al. (2013), Aloui et al. (2011), Corsetti et al.(2005).
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In Bae et al. (2003) it was proposed to consider contagion as a phenomenon associated with
extreme returns: if there is contagion, small return shocks propagate differently from large-
return shocks. In their study they focused on counts of coincidences of extreme returns rather
than on correlations of joint extreme returns. The different role of propagation of small versus
large returns will be seen to be a key ingredient in our model and indeed to be one of the main
mechanisms behind the creation of contagion.
Another issue relates to cause and effects in contagion. For example a study of Yang J., &
Bessler D. A. (2008) was able to use a vector auto-regression analysis to pinpoint that the 1987
crash originated in the US markets whereas a following upward movement of the Japanese
market was important for the subsequent recovery. However a clear-cut conclusion of what
started the market turmoil and what made it end is often difficult. For example Roll (1988)
came to a different conclusion in his analysis of 23 of the major markets worldwide, and argued
that in fact the international stock market crash of 1987 started in Asian countries, other than
Japan, and from there spread to Europe, the US and finally reached Japan. A different way to
obtain information about cause and effect is through surveys. In Shiller (1989) a survey places
the US as playing the dominant role in the international 1987 crash.
Our study offers to take a new look with respect to network analysis of contagion by in-
troducing a model in which cause and effect is inherently defined without need for statistical
test such as for example Granger causality tests. We will address new issues with respect to
network analysis in order to get a statistical understanding of the pathology of contagion and
also consider the question of cause of effect, something which the structure of the model allows
a direct identification of without the need for statistical tests on correlations.
In the following we will suggest to consider the world’s network of stock exchanges as a
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network of coupled oscillators. The idea is to consider each exchange as an oscillator of a
“force field” (to be defined below) which can influence the other oscillators in the network. Our
methodology enables a new understanding of how impact generated through non-linear price
dynamics can propagate across markets and can be used to study the origins behind contagion
effects in the network of stock exchanges. Contagion can in such picture be seen as synchro-
nization of the network of stock exchanges as a whole, caused in a large part of the exchanges
which adjust their “rhythms” (by pricing in price movements of the other exchanges) thereby
producing a global aggregate signal. One of the main features of our model is a separation of
time scales with a slow price dynamics due to economic fundamentals for a given country, and
a fast price dynamics due to impact across markets. An example illustrating how the method
identifies the network of propagation after a large stock movement of the Japanese stock market
the 23/05/2013 is shown in figure 1
2 2. Empirical methodology
2.1 2.1 Models of coupled Integrate-And-Fire (IAF) oscillators
In order to illustrate the concept of an IAF oscillator consider figure 2a. The figure shows an
oscillator with an amplitude, A(t), which increases constantly versus time t until it reaches a
thresholdAC = 1 after which it discharges and its amplitudeA is reset to zero. The process then
repeats until a new discharge takes place and so forth and so on. Figure 2a could equally well
be seen as three identically and independent IAF oscillators operating with the same constant
frequency. Assuming furthermore independence between the different units of oscillators the
system of oscillators is trivially described by the same oscillation as a single unit oscillator.
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Figure 1: “Price-quake”. One of the main advantages of the non-linearities in the integrate-
and-fire oscillator model is that it enables for a clear-cut identification of cause and effect. The
figure illustrates one example of a price-quake following an initial minus seven ercentage price
move of the Japanese stock market on the 23/05/2013.
Figure 2b illustrates over three time periods an IAF oscillator having a random frequency, or
equivalently, three different unit oscillators with random frequency over one time period. In
this case the aggregate response of a system with several units is less trivially especially if there
exists a coupling, i.e. dependence, between the units.
As will be seen in the following sections we argue that each stock exchange can indeed be
seen as an unit IAF oscillator, with oscillations determined by two contributions: i) a contribu-
tion from a characteristic proper (random) frequency, and ii) another contribution determined
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by the strength of coupling to the other unit oscillators in the network of stock exchanges.
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Figure 2: Illustration of an IAF oscillator. a) illustrates the case where the amplitude A(t)
of an IAF oscillator integrate linearly in time until it reaches a critical value AC after which it
discharges by setting A(t) = 0. The case in a) can be seen as one IAF oscillating over three
periods of time, or equivalent three identical and uncoupled IAF oscillators oscillating over one
period of time. b) shows over three time periods an IAF oscillator having a random frequency,
or equivalently, three different unit oscillators with random frequency over one time period.
2.1.1 2.1.1 The Olami-Feder-Christensen (OFC) model
In order to introduce the reader to the dynamics of coupled IAF oscillators we first discuss the
Olami-Feder-Christensen model (Olami, Feder and Christensen, 1992) since it can be seen as
a special case of our more general IAF oscillator model for the network of the world’s stock
exchanges. The introduction of the OFC model will allow a simple but general description of
the special non-linear dynamics of activity which is the hallmark of IAF oscillator models and
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which will also be seen to lead to a non-linear price dynamics of the world’s stock exchanges.
Originally the OFC model was introduced as a model of earth quake activity to capture the
stick-and-slip dynamics seen in earth tectonic plate movement. As will be seen such stick-
and-slip motion appears in our model due to “news” in terms of the price movements of other
stock exchanges which first imposes stresses across markets which then subsequently become
priced in. ”Stick” will be seen corresponding to the build up of stresses imposed on one stock
exchanges due to the price movement of another stock exchange, and ”slip” corresponds to
the following release of such stresses when they have been taking into account, i.e. have been
priced in.
The OFC model is described in terms of a force variable, Fi,j defined on a discrete
two-dimensional set of blocks (the set of blocks representing an earth tectonic plate) and
given by the coordinates (i, j). The dynamics of the model can be represented by a cellular
automaton description via the two rules I), II) presented in the following. The rules determine
the non-linear dynamics of the OFC model and will re-appear, but in a more complex form,
when we in the following introduce the price dynamics of the world’s stock exchanges:
I) A critical site (i, j) is defined as a site which has the force larger than a certain magnitude
FC , i.e. |Fi,j| > FC . If there are no critical sites (as e.g. when the model is first initialized) then
first find site (i∗, j∗) with maximal stress:
Fmaxi∗,j∗ = max(i,j)Fi,j (1)
Add the same additional stress ηi∗,j∗ ≡ (FC − Fmaxi∗,j∗ ) on all sites so that the site with maximal
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stress, (i∗, j∗), now becomes critical:
Fi,j = Fi,j + ηi∗,j∗ ∀(i, j) (2)
II) Else if there areN critical sites (i∗1, j
∗
1), (i
∗
2, j
∗
2), ..., (i
∗
N , j
∗
N) then simultaneously release
the stress of all those sites (make them “topple”):
Fi∗,j∗ = 0 ∀(i∗, j∗) (3)
and transfer a certain fraction, α, of their stress, F(i∗,j∗) (prior to the toppling) to their
nearest neighboring sites (i∗NN , j
∗
NN):
Fi∗NN ,j∗NN = Fi∗NN ,j∗NN + αF(i∗,j∗) ∀(i∗NN , j∗NN) (4)
One way to illustrate the non-linear dynamics behind Eqs.(1)-(4) is the representation of the
update of a critical block/site shown in Figure 3a-b. Figure 3a illustrates the event corresponding
to rule I where there were no critical blocks/sites in the network and where the block in the
middle had the largest stress (among all the blocks in the network) acting on it. According to
Eq.(2) a constant amount of stress was added to all the blocks such that the center block in
figure 3a attained the critical threshold FC which is indicated by the black color of the center
block. Figure 3b illustrates how the stress of the critical block is redistributed to its neighbors,
leading to two new critical blocks, according to Eq.(4). The stress of the critical block was then
reset to 0, as expressed from Eq.(3).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the force dynamics in the spring-block model of OFC model. a)
The central block has exceed the critical value, FC , indicated by the black color of the block.
Neighboring blocks are all sub-critical (indicated by the gray or white color). b) the stress
acting on the central block is released (the force reset to 0) and redistributed to neighboring
blocks which subsequently become either critical or sub-critical. The avalanche of force re-
distributions then continue by releasing the stresses on the two new block which have passed
the critical value which might lead to the creation of yet other critical blocks and so on and so
forth.
From Eq.(1)-(4) and Figure 3a-b one can now see that the OFC model corresponds to a
network of IAF oscillators. Take for example the central block shown in figure 3a: this block
has experienced subsequent increases of the amplitude of stress acting upon it, similar to the
IAF oscillator in Figure 2b. Once the force on the block hits the threshold FC , it is reinitialized
via Eq.(3) in analogy to the dynamics of the IAF oscillator in Figure 2b. The coupling between
the different IAF oscillator units happens through Eq.(4). Such a coupling was shown (Olami,
Feder and Christensen, 1992) to lead to a dynamics with power law probability distribution
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functions in the size of certain events called “avalanches”, with “avalanche” defined by the
number of sites involved in a disturbance as described via Eq.(2) under rule II. Having seen
how the OFC model can be understood as a coupled IAF oscillator network, we next turn our
attention to our “price-quake” model.
2.1.2 2.1.2 The “price-quake” oscillator model
To see how the idea of IAF oscillators can be defined in a financial market setting we consider
in the following the worlds stock exchanges as a network where each exchange can influence
the price dynamics of the other exchanges. Small price changes of a given exchange are not
assumed to have an immediate impact for other markets, only larger, eventually aggregate price
moves over several time periods, will be taken to have an impact across markets. Here we have
used the tendency for humans to ignore minor events and only react to larger stimuli, a fact
known in Psychology as “change blindness” (Jones, Crowell, & Kapuniai 1969; Lewin, Momen,
Drifdahl, & Simons 2000; Rensink 2002). In a financial market context such a phenomenon has
been documented through empirical analyses De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Lin (2012), Lin S.,
and Rassenti S. (2012). Such behavioral responses allows to describe financial models through
different perspectives Ha¨ma¨la¨inen et al. (2013); Vitting Andersen and Nowak (2013). It will
also be assumed that the relative capitalization of two markets as well as their geographically
closeness affect the magnitude of the impact one market can have on another.
The “price-quake” model of Vitting Andersen et al. (2011) can be formalized as follows:
at time t, a trader of a given stock exchange i estimates the price Pi(t) of the index as Pi(t) =
Pi(t − 1) exp (Ri(t)) with Ri(t) the return of stock exchange i between time t − 1 and time
t. Taking the trading volume as proxy for the relevance of reaction to new information, and
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noting that the trading volume is highest around the open/close of a market, we subsequently
only take into account the opening or closing prices of the different indices. If t denotes say the
close of index i, Ri(t) will therefore denote the return of index i between the open of index i at
time t− 1 and close at time t. The return Ri(t) is calculated by the traders taking into account
price movements in other stock exchanges (that happened in the time between the opening-close
or close-opening of index i) as well as local economic news, ηi(t) relevant only for the stock
exchange i:
Ri(t) =
1
N∗i
N∑
j 6=i
αi,jθ(|Rcumij (t− 1)| > RC)×Rcumij (t− 1)βi,j + ηi(t) (5)
Rcumij (t) = [1− θ(|Rcumij (t− 1)| > RC)]×Rcumij (t− 1) +Rj(t) ∀j 6= i (6)
N∗i =
N∑
j 6=i
θ(|Rcumij (t− 1)| > RC), αi,j = 1− exp (−Kj/(Kiγ)), βi,j = exp (−(|zi − zj|)/τ)
(7)
Rcumij describes the stress that exchange j imposes on exchange i, see second term in Eq.(6) and
first term in Eq.(5). Compared to the pricing of individual stocks, the structure of Eq.(5) has
similarities to the pricing obtained via the Capital Asset Price Model (CAPM) (Treynor, 1999;
Lintner 1965; Sharpe 1964) since it determines how a given stock exchange, i, should be priced
depending (in part) on the aggregate performance of the world’s other stock exchanges. How-
ever the particularity of Eq.(5) is the non-linearity that enters via the theta-functions of Rcumij
which ensure an impact across markets only for large, possibly aggregate, price movements.
Rcumij enters the pricing of exchange i with a memory of the past (possible aggregate), price
movements of exchange j, see first term in Eq.(6). Similar to the CAPM the sensitivity (called
β in the CAPM) of asset i to the “market of exchanges” is given by a sum of contributions in
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Eq.(5) with sensitivity coefficients given by αijβij now describing the relative impact between
stock exchange i and j. αij introduces a weighting in terms of the relative capitalization of
the two exchanges i, j (with γ setting the scale) and βij introduces a weighting in terms of the
difference in time zone (with τ setting the scale).
The price-quake model can now be written in terms of a cellular automaton as seen for the
OFC model. Inserting the impact of the update of stock exchange i at time t, Eq.(5), into Eq.(6)
one gets:
Rcumij (t) = [1− θ(|Rcumij (t− 1)| > RC)]×Rcumij (t− 1) + (8)
1
N∗j
N∑
k 6=j
αj,kθ(|Rcumjk (t− 1)| > RC)×Rcumjk (t− 1)βj,k + ηj(t) ∀j 6= i
The first term on the right hand side describes the aggregate nature of the stresses imposed on
Rcumij which keeps adding up until the value RC is attained, after which R
cum
ij is re-initialized
(the impact has been priced in, see Eq.’s(5)-(7) ). The second term accounts for the impact
across markets whereas the third term takes into account the stresses the price movement of the
market j has on all other markets i (i 6= j).
It should be noted that another spring-block related approach to financial markets has
recently been proposed in Sa´ndor and Ne´da (2015). In the following we give a cellular
automaton description of Rcumij similar to what was done for Fij of the OFC model (see
Figure 4). Treat the open/close of the different markets in sequential order. Assume that the
next event to happen at time tpresent is the close/opening of market j, then:
I: If there are no critical stress terms, i.e. |Rcumjk (tpresent − 1)| < Rc, k 6= j, then
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the only impact on Rcumij (tpresent) comes from the local economics news of the exchange
j, ηj(tpresent). If the stress imposed by ηj on all other exchanges i 6= j does not make
Rcumij (t) exceed its critical threshold, i.e. |Rcumij (t − 1) + ηj(t)| < Rc for all i, then the
system of the stress fields of the exchanges all remain sub-critical and there is presently
no impact on the other exchanges. If on the contrary |Rcumij (t − 1) + ηj(t)| > Rc the
local news on exchange j imposes stresses on the all other exchanges (as the case illustrated
in figure 4a) which in turn will have an impact when those exchanges close/open for t > tpresent.
II: If there are critical stress terms, i.e. |Rcumjk (tpresent − 1)| > Rc, k 6= j then the impact
on Rcumij comes partly from the local economics news and partly from past price movements of
the other exchanges as expressed via Rcumjk (tpresent − 1). This case is illustrated in figure 4b
where exchange 2 received a contribution from exchange 1 due to its past price behavior. The
impact may then, or may not, propagate further. For example Figure 4b illustrates a case
where exchange 2 does not itself incite further perturbations given the initial influence from the
exchange 1.
It is important to note that the oscillating field in the OFC model is the magnitude of the
force, Fi,j , on a given block (ij) so the oscillating field in this case is a scalar. However in the
price-quake model the oscillating stress field, Rcumij , acts between two stock exchanges i and
j therefore in this case the oscillating field is not a scalar but a second order tensor, just like
a stress tensor in Physics. Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics and couplings that exists between
the different elements of the stress tensor Rcumij . From Figure 4 it is clear that each of the
elements Rcumij corresponds to an IAF oscillator since it accumulates stresses up to a point RC
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after which the events have been priced in, and the stress tensor element is re-initialized (see
e.g. the element (2, 1) in Figure 4b). The coupling to the other IAF oscillators is given by the
dynamics described from Eq.(8).
In summary we have seen that in the price-quake model the stress field Rcumji is a second
order tensor which acts as an unit IAF oscillator coupled in network of similar IAF oscillators.
The units oscillators integrate via Eq.(8), fire when condition II) above is fulfilled and resets
to 0 (again via Eq.(6)). It should be noted that an important difference compared to the OFC
model is that increments of the stress field Rcumji can take both signs whereas the increments of
the force field Fij only took positive values.
3 3. Calibration and empirical findings of the IAF oscillator model
In Table I is shown the 24 indicies we will use in this study of the IAF oscillator model. The
same set of daily open and close were used in (Vitting Andersen et al., (2011)).
By constructing the conditional probability that the price movement of a given stock ex-
change would have the same sign as the open-close price movement of the US stock market,
a clear non-linear behavior was identified with random price movements of a given stock ex-
change (i.e. a conditional probability close to 0.5) following small US open-closes, whereas
larger US absolute price movements (say of order 0.02-0.04%) would lead to a conditional
probability close to one for a given market (Vitting Andersen et al., (2011)). Otherwise said,
a large movement of the prices in the US markets would most likely be followed by the same
tendency for the other exchanges, whereas small price movements in the US market would go
unnoticed. The tendency was particular clear for the Asian markets which are all closed during
15
Figure 4: Illustration of the dynamics of Rcumij in the “price-quake” oscillator model. a) at
t = t1 a large price movement of the index 1 imposes stresses on all the other indices i 6= 1 via
Eq. (6) with Rcum1i ≥ Rc. b) at t = t2 index 2 opens/closes, the impact from index 1 felt by
index 2 is priced in (Rcum21 = 0) and the index 2 in turn impacts the other indices, in this case
however without any critical impact on Rcumi2 . c) at t = t3 index 3 opens/closes and the impact
from index 1 felt by index 3 is priced in (Rcum31 = 0). The index 3 in turn impacts the other
indicies in this case a critical impact, Rcum3i ≥ Rc, which eventually can lead to other future
critical impacts.
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Country Stock index: Bloomberg name
AUSTRALIA AS30 INDEX
JAPAN NKY INDEX
SOUTH KOREA KOSPI INDEX
CHINA SSE50 INDEX
HONG KONG HSI INDEX
TAIWAN TWSE INDEX
SINGAPORE FSSTI INDEX
MALAYSIA FBMKLCI INDEX
INDONESIA JCI INDEX
INDIA SENSEX INDEX
ISRAEL TA-100 INEDX
EGYPT EGX70 INDEX
U.K. UKX INDEX
FRANCE CAC INDEX
GERMANY DAX INDEX
SWITZERLAND SMI INDEX
ITALY FTSEMIB INDEX
NETHERLANDS AEX INDEX
AUSTRIA ATX INDEX
ARGENTINE MERVAL INDEX
BRASIL IBOV INDEX
U.S. SPX INDEX
CANADA SPTSX INDEX
MEXICO MEXBOL INDEX
Table 1: List of Indices
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the US open-close whereas the European markets would have had some time to react to initial
price movements of the US markets (the European markets close shortly after the US markets
open). The same tendency was also found when the conditioning was made on a given price
movement of a world index (made of aggregate price movements of the stock exchanges). In
addition we have tested the impact of size of capitalization of a given market across markets.
This was done by conditioning the size of the price movement for a given markets and see its
impact in subsequent price movements of the different stock exchanges. As expected the less
important (in terms of capitalization) a market would be, the less pronounced would be the
impact across markets even for large price movements.
To summarize: empirical data of 24 of the major stock markets show a clear tendency
for small price movements to go unnoticed across markets but an imitation of price movements
happens following large price movements, notably for the markets with the largest capitalization
(e.g. the US). Similar effects was seen following aggregate price movements of the ensemble of
stock exchanges. Such non-linearity seen in the data has been taken into account in the pricing
of the price-quake model via the Theta-function given in Eq.’s(5)-(7).
It should be noted that there are five parameters in the model: N,Rc, τ, γ and the standard
deviation of the noise term for exchange i, σi. In the following we will take the same sigma
for all the exchanges, i.e. we let σ ≡ σi, but we have also conducted tests using different σis
to see the impact of heterogeneity of volatility in response to economic news for different stock
exchanges. We will comment on such results in the following mostly as additional remarks to
the more general findings where σi is taken the same for all indexes.
In (Vitting Andersen et al. (2011)) maximum likelihood was used to find the optimal param-
eters describing the pricing via the price-quake model. The values of the maximum likelihood
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tests gave the values: γ = 0.8, τ = 20.0, RC = 0.03 and σ2 = 0.0006. From Eq.(5) it is seen
that the difference ηi(t) = Ri(t)− 1N∗i
∑N
j 6=i αi,jθ(|Rcumij (t−1)| > RC)×Rcumij (t−1)βi,j should
be distributed according to a Gaussian distribution. In figure 5 is shown the difference men-
tioned, calculated similarly to (Vitting Andersen et al. (2011)), but using another data provider
(Bloomberg instead of Yahoo). It can be seen that for the parameter values obtained in the max-
imum likelihood procedure, the distribution describing the economic news terms, ηi, is well
described by a Gaussian distribution.
Figure 5: Number of events (in logarithmic scale) versus return for three different quantities:
red circles observed returns Ri, green squares 1N∗i
∑N
j 6=i αi,jθ(|Rcumij (t− 1)| > RC)×Rcumij (t−
1)βi,j and blue pluses the difference ηi.
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3.1 3.1 Definitions and measurements of price-quakes
Unlike most other pricing models in finance which are linear, the non-linear properties of our
model has the advantage of enabling a precise way of identifying cause and effect in price move-
ments across markets. Specifically we will in the following identify when a price movement in a
given market is the cause of later price movements in other markets. Such an identification will
allow us to define a ”price-quake” which is a series of price movements caused by the initial
price movements in either one or several stock indices.
In many of the existing IAF oscillator models one study the propagation of avalanches
following how the critical amplitude of the oscillators spread through out the network of
oscillators see e.g. figure 3 for the OFC model. As mentioned beforehand our unit IAF
oscillator is the tensor field Rcumij . However from a practical point of view the dynamics of
Rcumij is in itself less interesting compared to the price dynamics of the index. We will therefore
in the following concentrate on the impact of the price dynamics directly between the different
stock indices.To do so we first need to introduce some few definitions.
Definition 1: (critical stock index)
A stock index i is called critical positive (respectively critical negative) at time t with respect
to stock index j if and only if:
• the stock index i opens/closes at time t
• Rcumij > RC (respectively Rcumij < RC)
In order to define a price-quake we need a concept which clearly defines when price move-
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ments have an impact from one stock index to another, and vice verse, which price movements
in a stock index is influenced via price movements in another stock index. Given the structure
of the pricing formula Eq.(5), as will be seen, it will allow for a clear “finger-print” concerning
cause and effect of mutual price movements of stock indices.
We will distinguish between two different cases which we call respectively “Single Index
Price-Quake” (SIPQ) and “Cloud Index Price-Quake” (CIPQ). In the SIPQ case we follow
the perturbation of price movements from one stock index to another. In the CIPQ we instead
consider all those stock indices which are influenced by not just one but in principle several
stock indices. Before giving the two different definitions we however first need to be clear
about what it means to be influenced by an index or impacting an index.
Definition 2: (stock index i is singly influenced by stock index j - stock index j singly
impacting stock index i)
A stock index i has a price dynamics at time t which is singly influenced by the price
dynamics of stock index j, stock index j singly impacts stock index i if and only if
• The stock index i either opens or closes at time t
• |Rcumij (t − 1) + αi,jRcumij (t − 1)βi,j| > RC where t − 1 is the previous time for which
exchange i opened or closed
• t− 1 ≤ τ < t
• the stock index j is critical at time τ
The reason behind the definition 2 is that we know that only those exchanges j which
gives a contribution in the pricing formula Eq.(5) via the term αi,jθ(|Rcumij (t − 1)| >
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RC) × Rcumij (t − 1)βi,j can influence stock exchange i at time t. We can now define a single
index price-quake as follows:
Definition 3: (SIPQ)
A single index price-quake begins at time ts, is caused by stock index i, and lasts for T time
steps if and only if
• the stock index i is critical at time ts and is not influenced by any other stock index at time
ts
• each stock index which at time τ > ts is impacted by index i becomes part of the set of
the single index price quake. Future generations that are impacted by the set of indices
of the quake themselves become part of the quake.
• the quake stops at time ts +T where ts +T is the last time an index in the quake impacts
another index.
In order to consider the case of possible multiple influence/impacts we define:
Definition 4: (stock index i is multiply influenced by a set of stock indices C - the set of
stock indices C multiply impacting stock index i)
A stock index i has a price dynamics at time t which is multiply influenced by the price
dynamics of a set of stock indices C, the stock indicies C multiply impacts stock index i if and
only if
• The stock index i either opens or closes at time t
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• |Rcumij (t−1)+
∑
j∈C αi,jRcumij (t−1)βi,j| > RC where t−1 is the previous time for which
exchange i opened or closed
• t− 1 ≤ τ < t
• the stock index j is critical at time τ
The definition of a cloud index price-quake then follows along the same lines as that of the
single index price-quake:
Definition 5: (CIPQ)
A cloud index price-quake begins at time ts, is caused by stock index i, and lasts for T time
steps if and only if
• the stock index i is critical at time ts and is not influenced by any other stock index at time
ts
• each stock index which at time τ > ts is multiply impacted by a set of indices C becomes
part of the set of the cloud index price quake. Future generations that are multiply
impacted by the set of indices of the quake themselves become part of the quake.
• the quake stops at time ts+T where ts+T is the last time an index in the quake multiply
impacts another index.
Figure 6 gives an illustration of a SIPQ, whereas and figure 7 gives an illustration of a
CIPQ.
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Figure 6: An example of a SIPQ: the 24 indicies are represented as columns whereas the
rows represent the hours in a day increasing from top to bottom. Since we only consider open-
ing/closure times there are 24 markets and 48 events per day. Markets that open or close at
the same hour are considered a simultaneous event with no interaction between such markets.
In this way for every day the simulation of the model doesn’t manage 48 different times but
only, in average, 16. A positive critical return of a stock index is represented by a blue or grey
rectangle, whereas stock indicies which are not critical are represented by a yellow rectangle.
Finally, the blue line in the last column indicates the presence of a positive avalanche. A critical
stock index can be critical because another critical stock index impacted it (blue rectangle) or
critical caused by local news, i.e. not impacted by another index (gray rectangle). .
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Figure 6 shows a positive avalanche composed of 8 nodes in which there are two nodes
(gray rectangles) 6 and 22 which are not influenced by any nodes but do impact other nodes.
Such nodes are interesting because they play the role of the source for avalanches. In terms of
graph-theory these nodes have a zero in-degree, see discussion in the following section.
Figure 7: An example of a CIPQ: the negative critical stock indicies are represented by a red or
orange rectangle, whereas the stock indicies which are not critical are represented by a yellow
rectangle. The last column of the red line indicates the presence of a negative price-quake. As
for the single index price-quakes a critical stock index can be negative critical because of an an-
other critical stock index has impacted it (red rectangle) or due to a local cause without influence
from the network (orange rectangle). The price-quake is composed of 11 nodes in which there
are four nodes (orange rectangles) which are not influenced by other nodes: 12,17,19 and 22.
Node 20 is critical but does not influence other nodes and is therefore not part of the avalanche.
Consequently it is represented in gray
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As an additional test of our model we then compared simulated SIPQ distributions with the
empirical observed. To do so we first performed computer simulations of the price-quake model
using the parameter values as found in (Vitting Andersen et al. (2011)). That is we generated
normal distributed random variables ηi for each stock exchange (using same distribution for all
i) and updated the tensor stress field Rcumji via Eq.(9). After having ensured that the system
had entered a steady state we then measured the avalanche size distribution and avalanche time
distribution shown in figure 8a respectively figure 9a. We then compared these results to the
avalanche distributions obtained from the real data of the 24 stock exchanges. These results
appear in figure 8b respectively figure 9b. It should be noted that to obtain the distributions
for the real data the stress field Rcumji was not obtained from Eq.(9) but instead via Eq.(7). As
can be seen by comparing figure 8a and figure 8b, respectively figure 9a and figure 9b, there
is a nice agreement between the simulated results which had as only input the random normal
distribution of local returns and the real data using the returns of the stock exchanges.
3.2 3.2 Empirical findings
Having validated the parameter values of the IAF model we then use those values to obtain
the SIPQ and CIPQ statistics in a time interval over the period from 1/1/2000 to 31/12/2008.
Table II and III give the main statistics of the of both types of avalanches present in the network
of stock exchanges of the given time period. As expected from the definitions of the different
types of avalanches one observes in average longer lasting avalanches involving more indicies
for type CIPQ compared to SIPQ. However as can be seen from figure 8-9 the variation in the
number of nodes involved in an avalanche is large as illustrated by the power law shape of the
pdfs.
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Figure 8: Probability distributions of the size of SIPQ avalanches: a) simulated data, b) empir-
ical data .
Figure 9: Probability distributions of the time duration of SIPQ avalanches: a) simulated data,
b) empirical data .
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Number of SIPQ Averaged number of indicies involved Averaged duration (days)
Negative SIPQ 337 8.32 1.39
Positive SIPQ 515 5.27 1.22
Total SIPQ 852 6.46 1.28
Table 2: SIPQ Statistics
Number of CIPQ Averaged number of indicies involved Averaged duration (days)
Negative CIPQ 334 8.72 1.45
Positive CIPQ 497 6.13 1.33
Total CIPQ 831 7.17 1.38
Table 3: CIPQ Statistics
Since a SIPQ describes the case where one market impacts directly another (see definition 3)
we will in the following limit our discussion to this case due to its interpretation which is more
straight forward compared to a CIPQ where several markets can be involved in the impact of a
given market. It should be noted however that the statistics of the two types of avalanches are
quite similar since indeed a SIPQ is a special case of a CIPQ. The Table 4 shows the number of
times in which a stock index is critical. One can distinguish between a critical stock index which
is influenced (stock index 4,5,15,16,17, and 18 in Figure 6), a critical stock index that impacts
another index but is not influenced itself (stock index 6 and 22 in Figure 6) and stock index
which is critical but does not belonging to a price-quake (stock index 20 Figure 7). It can be
seen that the markets which are the most volatile, e.g. South Korea, Taiwan and Argentine, are
also the markets which are most often critical. But being critical does not mean impacting other
markets since it depends several factors such as for example the capitalization of the market. It
is not surprising to see that the market with the largest capitalization, the US, is also the market
which is the least times influenced in a SIPQ.
In order to get a more qualitative understanding one can analyze the different roles that
the different markets play. We show in Table 5 the percentage of time a critical market is
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critical positive critical negative Total amount
not influenced not influenced influenced not influenced not influenced influenced
not impacting impacting not impacting impacting
AUSTRALIA 17 19 44 6 8 52 146
JAPAN 47 37 72 50 45 70 321
SOUTH KOREA 74 59 134 66 57 128 518
CHINA 84 49 51 80 30 60 354
HONG KONG 34 41 114 28 40 116 373
TAIWAN 66 64 100 74 58 103 465
SINGAPORE 9 13 109 9 5 122 267
MALAYSIA 22 22 47 14 12 58 175
INDONESIA 40 29 118 36 13 100 336
INDIA 67 53 141 58 36 118 473
ISRAEL 24 22 100 24 17 94 281
EGYPT 25 0 81 17 0 56 179
U.K. 14 29 59 8 28 70 208
FRANCE 28 62 83 30 61 90 354
GERMANY 31 66 69 30 69 65 330
SWITZERLAND 20 35 88 20 39 82 284
ITALY 12 26 82 10 26 100 256
NETHERLANDS 11 22 129 12 18 148 340
AUSTRIA 46 25 65 22 24 66 248
ARGENTINE 116 54 92 97 37 94 490
BRASIL 80 69 88 75 54 77 443
U.S. 40 38 23 48 45 15 209
CANADA 29 24 65 22 28 57 225
MEXICO 45 30 102 23 17 95 312
Table 4: Activity in SIPQ: number of times in which a node is critical
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critical not influenced critical not influenced critical
and not impacting but impacting influenced
AUSTRALIA 15.1% 16.5% 68.9%
JAPAN 27.6% 24.1% 50.1%
SOUTH KOREA 26.8% 25.3% 60%
CHINA 43.1% 19.1% 38.8%
HONG KONG 14.4% 20.8% 72.7%
TAIWAN 30.8% 28.8% 47.4%
SINGAPORE 6.7% 6.7% 92%
MALAYSIA 18.9% 22.4% 62.1%
INDONESIA 22.5% 13.7% 68.7%
INDIA 26.5% 20.5% 63.1%
ISRAEL 15.6% 16.7% 72.1%
EGYPT 20.6% 2.2% 77%
U.K. 7.2% 17.7% 75%
FRANCE 16.7% 33.2% 57.9%
GERMANY 18% 38.6% 46.1%
SWITZERLAND 13.7% 26.7% 65%
ITALY 6.1% 19.4% 80.1%
NETHERLANDS 5% 11.7% 91.4%
AUSTRIA 24.1% 20.5% 55.2%
ARGENTINE 40.3% 19.8% 43.3%
BRASIL 31.4% 27.6% 41.1%
U.S. 26.4% 35.5% 38.4%
CANADA 18.5% 22.8% 65.7%
MEXICO 18% 17.6% 64.6%
Table 5: Different roles of the nodes in a SIPQ: impacting or influenced?
influenced/impacted. It should be noted that in this table one can read off from the second
column where the price-quakes start the most frequently conditioned that a market is critical.
Again we can see the important role of the US market as a source for avalanches, but also
larger markets like Germany and France are seen to often impact other markets once they attain
criticality themselves. The role as the source for avalanches is particularly important: when
in a market initiates a large number of price-quake it means that it is able to influence the
network. Vice versa, the market in which no price-quake starts plays a secondary role in the
price dynamics of the network.
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positive SIPQ negative SIPQ positive and negative SIPQ
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AUSTRALIA 0.31 0.26 0.05 0.62 0.62 0 0.47 0.44 0.03
JAPAN 0.37 0.56 -0.19 0.6 1.28 -0.68 0.49 0.92 -0.43
SOUTH KOREA 0.64 0.8 -0.15 1.14 1.4 -0.26 0.89 1.1 -0.21
CHINA 0.21 0.4 -0.18 0.52 0.62 -0.1 0.37 0.51 -0.14
HONG KONG 0.57 0.76 -0.19 0.99 1.59 -0.6 0.78 1.18 -0.39
TAIWAN 0.6 0.57 0.04 1.2 1.1 0.11 0.9 0.83 0.07
SINGAPORE 0.73 0.33 0.41 1.78 0.61 1.17 1.25 0.47 0.79
MALAYSIA 0.2 0.13 0.07 0.72 0.3 0.42 0.46 0.22 0.25
INDONESIA 0.68 0.32 0.35 1.53 0.5 1.03 1.1 0.41 0.69
INDIA 0.65 0.65 0 1.14 1.2 -0.06 0.89 0.93 -0.03
ISRAEL 0.74 0.25 0.49 1.51 0.44 1.07 1.12 0.34 0.78
EGYPT 0.58 0.03 0.55 1.04 0.03 1.01 0.81 0.03 0.78
UK 0.28 0.49 -0.21 0.75 1.13 -0.38 0.52 0.81 -0.3
FRANCE 0.45 0.74 -0.3 0.85 1.52 -0.68 0.65 1.13 -0.49
GERMANY 0.28 0.74 -0.46 0.52 1.46 -0.94 0.4 1.1 -0.7
SWITZERLAND 0.52 0.54 -0.03 0.89 1.15 -0.26 0.7 0.84 -0.14
ITALY 0.51 0.51 0 1.13 1.07 0.07 0.82 0.79 0.03
NETHERLANDS 0.74 0.58 0.17 1.47 1.36 0.12 1.11 0.97 0.14
AUSTRIA 0.31 0.21 0.1 0.67 0.48 0.19 0.49 0.35 0.15
ARGENTINE 0.44 0.44 0 0.83 0.91 -0.07 0.64 0.67 -0.04
BRAZIL 0.35 0.7 -0.34 0.64 1.1 -0.46 0.5 0.9 -0.4
US 0.12 0.48 -0.37 0.1 1.04 -0.94 0.11 0.76 -0.65
CANADA 0.32 0.37 -0.05 0.53 0.87 -0.34 0.42 0.62 -0.19
MEXICO 0.53 0.28 0.24 1.03 0.45 0.57 0.78 0.37 0.41
average 0.46 0.46 0 0.93 0.93 0 0.69 0.69 0
Table 6: Average in-degree and out-degree in a SIPQ
Adding further network analysis one can compute the average in-degree and out-degree over
all the avalanches. For each node one obtains the results shown in Table 6.
We observe that:
• The number of links is higher in the negative avalanches meaning that contagious negative
price movements tend to include more markets compared to the spreading of positive
price movements.
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• It is possible to compute a balance for each node (∆(in-degree)−(out-degree)): if it is
positive we have a node that is more impacted by other markets than it influences other
markets, if it is negative it is the other way around. Again this measure reveals the dom-
inant role of strong markets as US and Germany and, on the other hand, the completely
negligible role in the network of markets such as for example Egypt, Israel or Singapore.
An interesting property of our model is that it allows us to identify those markets which are
the main sources for the contagion described via the avalanches. One way to illustrate this is
to consider a market i in which a SIPQ starts: the market i becomes critical, not necessarily
because the network influences it, but because of local news (ηi), or a series of local news or
impacts from the network that accumulates over time. Therefore we can obtain a ranking among
all market in term of source of contagion if we compute, for each market, the times in which
a market is source of a SIPQ and then divide it by the total number of SIPQ’s. We obtain the
ranking shown in Table 7.
A bit to our surprise the US in this case doesn’t appear to be the main source of contagion,
rather the European markets like Germany and France take the leading role when described by
this measure. One way to proceed further along such kind of analysis is to consider not just
the tendency of a given market to be the source of contagion but also how far the contagion
will spread? In this regard we have computed the average number of markets belonging to
an avalanche that begins in a given market i. The results are given in Table 8. Considering
Table 8 again emphasizes the role of the US market notably with respect to positive contagion
of positive market returns. Also the U.K. appear to be a very dominant market for positive
market returns something which was less clear from the other statistics we have considered
so far. Quite striking is also the large impact that the Swiss market have but on the negative
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Percentage of times in which in a market starts a SIPQ
GERMANIA 15.8%
FRANCE 14.4%
BRAZIL 14.4%
TAIWAN 14.3%
SOUTH KOREA 13.6%
ARGENTINE 10.7%
INDIA 10.4%
US 9.7%
JAPAN 9.6%
HONG KONG 9.5%
CHINA 9.3%
SWITZERLAND 8.7%
UK 6.7%
ITALY 6.1%
CANADA 6.1%
AUSTRIA 5.8%
MEXICO 5.5%
INDONESIA 4.9%
NETHERLANDS 4.7%
ISRAEL 4.6%
MALAYSIA 4.0%
AUSTRALIA 3.2%
SINGAPORE 2.1%
EGYPT 0%
Table 7: The ranking of the markets in which a SIPQ starts
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Average number of nodes belonging to an avalanche that starts from a market
Positive SIPQ Negative SIPQ SIPQ
AUSTRALIA 12.3 7.5 9.9
JAPAN 9.4 5.6 7.5
SOUTH KOREA 10.5 9.4 10
CHINA 5.9 9.2 7.5
HONG KONG 8.6 7.1 7.8
TAIWAN 8 8.6 8.3
SINGAPORE 8.7 5 6.8
MALAYSIA 4.5 5.2 4.8
INDONESIA 5.8 8.2 7
INDIA 9.2 6.8 8
ISRAEL 8.8 5.6 7.2
EGYPT 0 0 0
UK 15.2 5.1 10.2
FRANCE 12.8 6.8 9.8
GERMANY 10.8 7.5 9.1
SWITZERLAND 10.2 12 11.1
ITALY 11.3 6.2 8.7
NETHERLANDS 10.5 19 14.8
AUSTRIA 9 5.8 7.4
ARGENTINE 7.4 7.5 7.5
BRAZIL 9.8 6.8 8.3
US 14 7.3 10.6
CANADA 7.3 7.3 7.3
MEXICO 9.3 9.3 9.3
Table 8: The number of markets, in average, impacted by a SIPQ starting from a given market i
influence across the network. It should be noted that the apparent impact of the Dutch market
is an artifact since this market open/closes on hour before the other European markets and so
is the first market to incorporate news that happened in the Asian/ North American markets.
This creates a “spurious” effect where the Dutch market appear responsible for impacts on the
European markets for price movements that happened elsewhere.
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4 4. Conclusion
We have introduced a IAF oscillator model to describe the pricing in the worlds’s network of
stock exchanges. It has been shown how contagion within such a model can be understood as
synchronization of the network of stock exchanges as a whole, caused in a large part of the
exchanges which adjust their rhythms (by pricing in price movements of the other exchanges)
thereby producing a global aggregate signal. One of the main features of our model is a sep-
aration of time scales with a slow price dynamics due to economic fundamentals for a given
country, and a fast price dynamics due to impact across markets. The characteristic non-linear
price behavior of the IAF oscillators is supported by empirical data and has a behavioral origin.
One advantage of the IAF dynamics is that it enables for a direct identification of cause and ef-
fect of price movements. Our methodology of identifying cause and effect via avalanche price
dynamics combined with network analysis has enable us to identify the most relevant nodes
with respect to onset of contagion in the network of stock exchanges.
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